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DOES THE CONSTIT"CTION PROTECT FREE SPEECH? . . 
M ANY thoughtful men and women, witnessing the suppression of speech, by means both judicial and extra-judicial, in the 
period through which we have just passed, have reluctantly con-
cluded that our hard won .right of freedom of speech has been lost, 
swept away in the flood tide of war enthusiasm. They point to the 
example of the recent candidate for the presidency, Eugene Debs, 
who is still.confined in a federal prison for words he uttered during 
the w3r. They call attention to the fact that the {ate of Mr. De~s 
is no worse than that of scores of other per5ons, mem~rs of his and 
other minority groups, who have gone to jail since Aptjl, 1917, for 
giving utteran~ to unpopular opinions. Finally, they show us a· 
widespread wave of "anti-disturbance" legislation among our state 
lc;gislatures during and immediately after the war.1 
Things have now: quieted down. We no longer jump with appre-
hension at hearing the word "Bolshevist." . Attention is turning ta 
the multitude \lf que..ctions arising out of our return to a de facto, 
if not a de jure, state of peace. In the meantime, our federal 
Supreme Court has had occasion. in cases ari~ing under the Espion-
age Act, to give us some authoritative expositions of the legal mean-
. ?ng of that frecd0m of speech guaranteed by our Constitution. It 
seems desirable to see how far these detjsions have'laken us in set-
ting out the limitS of lawful speech, before our interest is· entirely 
diverted to matters more pressing. 
"Congress shall make no law* * *abridging the freedom of·~ 
or of the press.'' These are the unyielding words of tlie First 
Amendment, the first of the federal "Bill of Right!.'' S~ pro. 
visions. are to be found in nearly all State constitutions.1 bo the 
words mean, literally, that neither Congress nor 1~1ature a.n pun-
· 
1 For ·references to these statutes and a criticism of their effectiven~ 
see 20 Cot.UKBIA L lb:v. 232 (Feb., 19:!0), and see a note in 4 AKIL L. Ra. 
3J6 OD "ValiditY. of l.egUlation Apinst Dangerous Social ·or Industrial 
Propagmda." . 
•:wiiite a few of the states .have taken this identical language.. most of 
them have taken their free spee'ch clause from the New Yo& Constitution 
o'f 1822, Art. 7, § 8. Thiis, the Iowa Constitution, Art. t, I 7, provides.-: 
"Every person may speak, write and publish bis sentiments on .all aubjedl, 
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ish words alone, no matter what they are? A few exampl~ will 
show that such an absolute conception of the meaning of f recd om 
of speech is untenable. A man might persuade another to murder 
his enemy, he might defame his neighbor,_ he might perjure himself 
on the wi~ess stand, he might indu~ a soldier to deseJt his post. 
Surely, constitutional protection was not meant for him. 
But if a -definition of free speech is not to ~ an absolute one, 
applicable to all words, what is it to be? So far as the question 
invol~es .Jegal rights sec~red by a constitution, we naturally tum to 
the (iecisions of courts of final authorifY. whose function is to intcr-
pJ;:et tlie Constitution. The legal significance of many clau$es ·of 
our federal Constitution has been determined. in this fashi1:>n. The 
"commerce clause," by which the Congress was given authority to 
regulate interstate conuiierce, and .the "due process of law" clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment are examples wh~ch readily suggest 
themselves._ 
With the fr~ speech provision we have no such help. The 
Supreme Court has said that the Bill ·of Rights fa the Constittition 
was designed simply to embody certain general guaranties inherited 
from English ancestors, which had always been subject to certain 
well-defined exceptions arising· from necessity.• Sc.- the. free speech 
clause does not prevent the exclusion of lottery tickets' or obscene 
matteri from the mails; neither does it privilege words inter£ ering 
with pending proceedings in a court .of justice.• No doubt we may 
safely say that speech which would be a common law tort or crime 
is still a basis of liability despite a free speech clause.' But until the 
recent cases under the ~ar-time Espionage Act came before the 
Supreme Court there was little to mark out for us what the limits 
being responsible for the _abuse of that right. No law shall be N$Sed to 
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the preu • • *" 
•Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275. :.281. : 
•In re Rapier, 143 U. S. no. 
•Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. '121· 
•Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418. Accord, Field 
v. Thornell, 1o6 Iowa 7, article commenting on merits of prosecution's case, 
delivered to members of the jury before the cause was submitted to them. 
• Chafec in 32 HARV. L. REv. 943. citing Mr •. Jtistice Holm~s in Frohwerk 
v. United States, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249, 250: "The First Amendment * • • 
obviously was ·not intended to give immunity for every possilile use of Jan. 
guage • * * We venture to believe that neither Hamilton, nor Madison. nor 
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of free speech are.• St8:J1dard treatises on constitutional law devote 
little space to a discussion of the First Amendment,9 and indeed 
their·authors had little on which to base sutjl discussion. The Sedi-
tion Act of 1798 made it a Criminal offense to publish false matter 
against ''either· house of the Congress of the United States or 
the president of.the United States with intent to bring th~m or t>ither 
of them into contempt or disrepute." There were convictio~ under 
·this act shocking fo. one,s sense-of justice.10 but it eicpired by its own 
limita~ion before Chief Justjcc Marshall-reached the Supreme Bench, 
and before the court had annoonced its authoritv to· declare an act 
of Congress unconstitutiqnal. ·Good authority, Jeff~r~n included, 
believed the law in conflict. with th~ Constitution.11 Again, in 1861, 
any other competent ~on then or l!Lter, ever supposed that to make crim-
inal the counselling of' a murder • • • would be an unconstit11tional intcrfer-
. ence with free speech.• · 
•Legal "periodicals have been full of ·well written discussions of this sub-
j~ recently, several of the ~e.s dealing with the historical basis of. free 
speech problems. The present writer has nothing original to add to wba~ 
has been said on the historical" poinL For the different theories regarding 
what freedom of speech and press ·means. ·sec Pound, "Equitable Relief 
.Against Defamation,~ 29 HAJW. L. R!v. 64o. 6So. Professor Chafee, in "Fret-
dom of S~ in War Time," 32 HAJW •. L. ~- 932. ~laborates and.discusses 
the theories. His crificisni of Blackstone's conception that f~m here 
means freedom from censorship, and a s~d theory, ·that freedom of spcecb 
distingiiishes "use" and "abuse" of utterance, is so complete that 'further 
elaboration is unnecessary. With this essay, too, may be found a long and 
useful list of references on the topic in ~neral In addition, on the histor-
ical side, sec "Constitutionality of Sedition La'WS)" by M. G. Waitace, 6 VA. 
L. Rzy. 385; "Freedom of Speech and the .Press in the Federalist Period; 
The Sedition Act,• by Tbomu F. Carroll, 18 M1cu. L. ~- 615; 'The Power 
of Government over Speech and Press," by F. G. Hart, 29 YAU L Jou.. 4IO. 
Since this discussion was -written has appeared "Freedom of Speech and 
Press under the First Amendment: A Resume." by Prof. Edward S. CorwiO: 
30 YA~ L..JoU1. #/! (No~ ... 1!)20)..and comment thereon by C: E. C. on page 
68 of the i:ame number. •. 
• ~e,· for iAstance, the ·paucity of treatment in a work like Wn.t0ucsn 
OH TBt CoKSTiTU'l'ION,.§f-45(), 451. 
»united States v. Callender, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14. 709; United S~tes T. 
Cooper, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 1.c, IJt>s. 
:n Sec M. G. Wallace in 6 VA. L. ~- on 386. and authority (:ited. In 
Abrams v. United States, infra, Mr. Justice Holmes says: "I had ~onceived 
that the United States through many years bad shown its reperitancc for the 
Sedition Act of 1798 • • ·• by repaying fines that it imposed.• 
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ap act punished conspiracy to levy war against the United States, 
bu.t nothing decided tmder it gives an authoritative exposition of 
the right of free spccch. 
Of more than usual interest, then, are ~e cases whir.h our Supreme 
Court has decided under the recent .Espionage Act.12 ·Hot all of the 
decisions ~re worihy of notice here, for some of. them ~ent off on 
technical points.. Others are vel)Z. important. As ·might be expected, 
s0me of them have been the subj~ct of hot contrcJYersy. The bril-
liant ~issent of Mr. Justice Holmes in the ~amot1S Abrams v. {T,.iltd 
States case, of which more hereafter, was callea by different (and 
differing) writers in one of our best legal periodicals "shocking in 
its· obtuse indifference to the vital issues at stake in Augµst, ig18; 
and * * * ominous in its portent ~ lik~ indifference to pending and 
coming issues,"11 and '1a literary and judicial ctas5ic'' the courageot11 
language of which "saves from pessimism those who still have fait:J 
in our Bilt of _rights.'11• · · 
The Espionage.Act was passCd by Congress June 15, 1917.11. Title 
One, Section Three of this statute made it a crime, w.hile the United 
States is at war, "(1) to mak~ false statements with intent to ititer-
fere with the operation of our fighting forces; (2) to cause or attempt 
to cause disloyalty or insubordination in army or navy; (3) . will-
fully to obstruct or attempt to obstruct recruiting. In 1918 the list 
of crimes was greatly enlarged to reach ;'individital disloyal utter-
ances.'! · Nine ·mare offenses were added. 18 Such proSccutions as 
have been pa$sed upon in .the Supreme Court decisions have not, 
however, brought the broader prohibitions of the amended act under . . 
u Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 39 Sup: Ct. Rep. 191 (not 
an important case on development of the law. : The court decides that an 
instruction given was sub~tantially equivalent to the one asked) ; Schenck v. 
United Stites, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. -247; Frohwerk v. United States, 
249 U. S. 204. 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; Debs v. United StatCs,.249 U.·S. 2u, 39 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
17; Stilson v. United St.ates, 250 U. S. s8J.. 40 Sup. Ct. 28 (deals wilh pro-
cedural matters only); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, '40 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 259; Pien:e v. United States, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; O'Connell v. United 
States, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444 (deals wilh procedural maUers) •. 
u Dean John H. Wigmore in 14 ltJ.. L IU:v. 539. 54S. · · 
"See note by L G. C., 14 Iu.. L. R!:v. 6q1. 
u u. s. CoKP. STA'I'. s. 1917, § 10212C.. 
"Act of May 16, 1918, l:T. S. Coin. STA'I'. 1918, ! 102I2C. 
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its scrutiny. It cannot be said on authority, for instance, whether 
"abusive language about • * * the uniform of the Army of the 
United States" (one of the crinics under the amended act), spoken 
by a perspiring second lieutenant on a sticky August day about ~is 
leather puttees, is given immunity by the free speech clause of the 
Constitution or a.ot. But while the cases decided by the Supreme 
Court under this statute by no means give us a complete text-book 
on free speech, they are worth noticing somewhat in detail, for they 
are the most ~t authority we haft. · 
· Stlrffcll v~ United States1' ·affirmed the conviction. of Schenck, 
general secretary of the Socialist party, for conspiracy to cause and 
attempt to cau,se insubordination in the military forces and to obstruct 
enlistment service. Schenck was found to have been instrumental 
in sending-out a circular, which attacked the conscription act~ to men 
who had been called anci accepted Jor miiitary ~rvice. From the 
reported decisjon if ~ppears that the ~fendant did not deny that 
the jury ·could have found the circular was intended to induce drafted 
me~ to obstruct the operation qf the:selective service law. 
Mr. Justice Holmes, delivering the unanimous opinion of the 
c:oW:t, made Clear two points: first, .the right of free· speeCh, under 
which Schenck claimed immunity,·is not an absolute and unchanging 
thing.· War does make a difference. "When a. nation b at war many 
things that might be. said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its 
efforts that their _utterance wm not De endured so long a!' men fight." 
Where the lawmaking body may draw the line we are not told.; this 
·question was nOt before the court. The defense seems to have 
admitted that Congress could lawfully penalize interference with 
fighting forces." The only question then was, how far. could the law. 
go in punishing a conspiracy for attempting to interfere? 
The second important thing done in this decision is to lay down 
a t~ of liability for ~: · · 
"The question in every case is \1{hether the words are used 
in such ciroumstances and are of· such a nature ~ ~ creaJe 
a cle~r and present danger that they will bring about the nb-
stantivt etiils thal Congress had a right to pr(ilenf.'#1• 
• ~ U. S. 4fi, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247• 
•Italics are miDe. 
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This is. very -important; the liability is not to be found in the general 
effect of the words, nor in what may be thought to be their danger-
ous tendency. !~stead, the test is similar to the common law liability 
for attempt to conunit a crime--the act done_ by the wrongdoer must 
have come dangero~ly near to success.1• ·•success'' in this instance 
would be the substantive ~vii specifi~d· by Congress in the statute, 
interference with fighting forces of the country in war-time. 
In two other cases the same month, March, 1919, the unanimous 
court, again through Mt.". Justice Holmes, reiterated the same crite-
rion of "clear and present danger," in affirming the conviction of 
Frohwerk,20 of the Missouri Staats-Zeitung~ and that of Eugene 
Pebs. 2~ The· Debs ~e has been unpopular in some: quarters on the 
groundo> that the accused was convicted merely because the jury 
thought the· speech, upon which the charges against him were based, 
had perhaps some general ~endency (as distinguished from a clear 
and present danger) to bring abc;iut resista~ce to the draft. :12 Whether 
or not that i~ the fact, the Supreme Court does not change its first 
statement of the law governing .liability for ~ 
In November, 1919, ·Was decid~ the ·case of ~brams v. United 
State~," probably the most widely known of all the Espionage~. 
the conduct of which has prov.ok~ much adverse diseussion.1• .The 
def end~ts in tl!is qtSe ha<t prepar~ arid distributed circulars for the 
p1:1rpo.se of opposing participation by the United' States ·in the cam-
paign against the Bolshevik government.· 11te circulars were abusive 
of the president, denounced· an alleged tinion Qf capitalism a~d mili-
tarism i~ the allied n;itions, and made the stoc~ appeal to ~e workers 
for a general strik~ as a reply to the ''barbaric intervetition.~ The 
defendants were convicted under the amended Espion~ ·Act, atTd 
the conviction affirmed by a divided Supreme Court, Justices Hotines 
u See Joseph H. Beale, "Criminal Attempts." 16 HAllV. L· Rtv. 491. 
• Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204. 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24!J. 
:n Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251 
.. See 19 NEW R£Pus1.1c 19: 19 NEW Re-um.re 151. This is Professor 
Chafee's view. ~e p. g68 of his article, above cited, in 32 HARVARD ·I.Aw 
REmtw. 
"250 o. S. 6i6, 40.Sup. Ct. Rep. 17. 
·•The best the writer h3s seen is that of Professor Z. Chafee; "A Con-
temporary State Trial-:-Th"e United States v~rsils Jacob. Abnuhs. el a~.,'i ·33 
H.~n. L. . R!v. ·~41. · 
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and Brandeis dissenting. · Despite th~ fact that the judges disagreed. 
it is difficult to put a finger on the exact difference between majority 
and minority.as to the law. The dissenters urged that there was 
n9 evidence on which a jury o'f reaso~ble men cou}d find against 
the defendan~s. "The surreptitious pu~lishing, of a silly· l~ct by 
an Unknown man:• £Guld not ·present any immediate danger of inter-
f erc;nce with .tile. success· of go.vemment arms, thought the ·minority. 
Tlie ~jority opinion spends little time in diseussing the· Ici.w, s~ 
ing to assume con~titutioncll points settled by th~ previous· ·cases 
·already mentioned. It denounces the c0nduct of the defendants and 
deems the evidence sufficient to .sustain their conviction. Professor 
Chaf ee's able. discussion of the history. of the ca5~ make$ one believe 
that great i~jtistice ~ been done the individuals coridemned to spend 
tlre best part ·of their liv~ 'in jail .•. But the majority's .opiniot) does 
1JOt.-write.that injitstice.into the law, at least .so far as the ·language 
goes. It miglit as well have bcet.i a ~emo~um. decision affirming 
the conviction, for an the help it giyes in defining a>Qstitutionat lim-
its of free speech •. The·dissent.of Mr;.justice irolines, ~hcther right 
or wrong iii his vicW of the faqs, is ·a~·.ne ~ression·of pragmatic 
legal philosophy and well deserve$ to be called:"a literary and judi-
cial classic." It .bas ~ ~dely quot~, but. it is eloquent enouib 
to des~rve r~~on of an .~cerpi· whi~ is w~ ~Cral readinp: 
. ;,Persecution-for .the CJCR~OD. Qf "opinion$ seems to ~e 
perfectly.logical.\ Ify~uhave no.dotibt·_9f·your p~ or 
your power,. and. want .a ~ ... resiiJt with au ybur heart. 
you naturally· CJCprcss your wishe5 ~-. taw and sweep away 
all opposition. To·allow opposition-.by speech seems to indi-
cate that you.think the speech impotent. as ·when a man says 
that he has 5quared the circle, or that you· ·do. not care whole-
heartedly for the result, or tliat you dou1>t ·either your powu 
or your premises. But when men have realized that time has 
upset many fighting faiths; they inay ~OJDe to believe even 
iitore t~ they believe 1he veey foun~tiomi of their own 
condoct,- that ~c uitimate good desi.red is better reacned by 
free trade in ideas-that the ml 'test of t,mb is the ·pow.er. 
of th~ thought to get itself a".Of'Plr d .in the competition ci 
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~e market, and that truth i6 the only ground upon which 
their wishes:ijafely tan be carried out. That, at any rate, is 
the theory of our Constitution .. ·It is ·an experiment, as all 
life is an experiment." Every year. if not every day. we 
have to. wager.our salvation upon some prophecy based upon 
imperfect knowledge. While {hat experimel!t is part of our 
system, I think that we should be eternally vigilant ;tgainst 
attempts to -ch~ th«; expression of opinions that we loath 
and l>elieve to ·be. fraught with death, unless they so immi-
·nently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and 
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is 
reqtiired to save the eountry.·• ••Only the _emergency that 
makes it iir.mediately dangerous to leave the correction 9f. 
evil counsels to time war1CU1ts making any exception to the 
sweeping conunhnd, 'Congress sha,11 make no law abridging 
the freedom of spcC!ch.' ·• ** ~ I regret that I cannot put into 
more. impressiv~ .words my· belief that in their conviction 
upoil this indictment ttie . def eiidants ·were d_epriv~ of their 
rights under the Constitutian of the United States:-" 
In Mar~ 1920, we have the last two· important Espionage deci-
sions. In each, Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissent. The first 
c:aSe, that of Schaefw v. United States, 27 affirmed the convietion of 
officers of an obscure Pennsylvania concern publishing a weak little 
German newspaper. Agai~ the majority· opinion discusses facts for 
the most part Mr. Justice -McKenna, speaking for the majority of 
of the <:ourt, says that when free speech or any right. "becomes 
wrong by excess iS· ·somewh;lt elusive of dcfiniti~," and he does 
not tell us where he will draw the line. Mr. Justice Brandeis reem-
phasizes the "clear and present .danger" criterion of liaJ>J1ity, and 
the majority do not dispute his test. 
•This thought is. too. much {or. Dean Wigmore to stomach, and in hil 
discussion in I• Iu.. I.. REv., on p. S(ir, he sets it out in capitals with an 
abundance of exclamation points. He says: "* • • when found publicly 
ttcorded in an opinion of the Supreme Guardians of that Constitution, 
licensing propaganda which in the neXt ~before the court ma:r ~·ditteted 
agafust that Constitution itself, this language is ominotis indeed." Does 
Dean Wsgmore mean that our Constitution is the last step pos_sib1e in the 
evolution of government, and hence above criticismP 
•-to Sup. Ct. Rep. 25 
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It seems to the writer that the last case decided, Pi4ru v. Unit14 
States, 21 March 8, lg20, is the most important decision since the 
Schenc~ case, the first under the :ict. It was a particufarly striking 
one on its facts, and even· a reading of the decision of the majority 
of the court, which sustained the conviction of the def en<tants, 
makes one feel that the pnni~hing of the prisoners was very harsh. 
The act done by the defendants was the distribution of a pam-
phlet sent out from Socialist headquarters to the Albany New York, 
"local" for dis~ribution. When the literclture first an-Wed the ques-
tion of its distribution was 'brought up, and acting on the advice of 
a la'Wyer mC'mber, the Albany group voted to postpone their circula-
lion of the matter until the outcome of a Maryland prosecution, 
involving the same pamphlet, was determined. The Maryland judge 
ordered an acquittal of the defendants in the prosecution before him. 
It seemed safe, therefore, to go ahead in Albany, and this was done. 
But the distnoutors were arrested there, a jury readily convicted 
them, and their conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
The literature which brought these men to grief was a four-page 
leaflet written by Irvin St. John Tu~r, an Episcopal clergyman. 
who,· as Mr. Justice Brandei.~ points out, was a man of sufficient 
prominence to have been included in "VVho's .Who in AmeriC:a" for 
1916-1917. The ~phlet pictured the horrors of the war, though 
not more vividly than some of the descriptions an~ pictures that.8 
ben~volent censor permitted to come before our eyes from: of!icid 
sources.. It argued that the misery depicted wa.c; the logkal outcome 
of .the refusal of the people to accept Socialism. It called atter.tiGn 
to rising food prices, stated that •'The attorney general of the United 
·States. is SQ busy sending to prison men w~o do not stand up when 
'The Star-Spangled Banner' is ptayed. t}jat he has no. time to protect: 
the food supply from gamblers." Though no harsher than charge! 
made by opponents since, this must have been a sore point with tile 
prosecution for it was felt nee°..ssary to 'show that clvi~ians were 
n~t compelled by law to stand wherr the National Anthem was 
played·~ 
Injustice may have been done the particu1.iir individuals involved. 
11iat is a question that could_ only be fairly passed upon after exam-
• 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205-
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ination of the whole record of the case in upper and lower couris. 
Even then opinions might well differ. But it seems to the writer 
that the decision is important because the" majority opinion, this 
time through the very able Mr. Justi~e Pitney, adopts the doctrines' 
technically known as- "indirect causation" and "constructive intent" 
as a source of liability. If the majority of the court does adopt 
them, t.;en the decision is most important and the Espionage Act 
has· become a "most effective c;ilencer. of all but. the most polite dis-
cussion for all war-time. periods until it is repealed. 
The doctrine5 mentioned are of long standing,'' but for .a hun-
d:Cd and twenty years had .not been applied i~ the United States. 
Their meaning can be ~sily explained. Admit that the evil the 
statute is aimed to prevent is· one regarding which Congress bas 
power to exercise preventive measures, causing insubordination in 
the artny, for instance. What words come within the penalty of 
the -law? May at• ::pCech which might be said t~ have· some tend· 
ency, however remote, to btj_ng about ·acts in violation· of law be 
puni$h~d, or only words which directly incite to acts in violation 
of- law? Suppose that a man criticizes anny food, do not his words 
have ·s0me <tendency, at least in the mind of a jury with a strong 
imagination and in thorough s}rmpathy with the war, to cause Unrest 
and subsequent insubordination among soldiers? And it ,wouldn't 
matter, would it, whether the words were said Clirectly to a soldier, 
or to a woman's club some of whose members had relatives or 
friends· in. the army? Under this doctrine· of "indirect causatian" 
words can· be punii;bed for supposed bad tendency long befor.e the 
probability arises·that they will break into unlawful ads. It is obvi-
ous th~t this test of liability is in sharp eont~st with the "clear and 
present dtinger".rule of Mr.Justice Holmes. It,has far-reaching 
co~u~ces. What rabout the man who denounces an excess 
profits tax bill? Do not his words have a tendency to encour.ige 
anOtber to violate the law? What of the Arizona statesman who is 
!'Cp9rted to have said that i~ the ·united States Government gave 
Caranza permission to take trooi>s through his State he hoped the 
people would. prevent their passage. Did 1tis words not have a 
"tendenci' to _provoke vi~lence? Any person of influence who' 
•patter discussion of these doctrinrs ma,- be found in Professor Cbafee'• 
article, p. 948 el 1tq., in 32 H.uv. L. ~. 
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expresses an opinion in some way remotely encourages another to 
act in accordance with the opinion expr,essed. 
Hand in hand with th~s "indirect causation" doctrii~e goes thal 
of "constructive intent." The only intent the deiendant must ban 
is intent to write or si>eak the words lie did. If the words have a 
bad tendency we will presume the man intr.nded unlawful conse-
quences, on the gro1,U1d- that he is presumed to intend the conse-
quences of his acts. Now we have many places in the law where 
a man is liable for .consequences even when he did not specifically 
intend them. If he shot off a gun at random in a crow1k4 street_ 
and killed someone, he certainly could not escape pgnishment by 
saying he didn't intend ~o kill his victim. We ·can Ftay that he is 
presumed to intend the natural consequence of his act, which is 
pure fiction." We may accurately say that specific intent to-.hit 
the very per5on he did is not by law required in order to hold him 
liable. But often crimes do require a spf.cific inten~ and if they 
do, such intent must be proved.11 When a penal statute, such as 
the Espionage Act, makes certain speech a crirrie, such as advo-
cating curtailment of production 10£ things necessary to the prose-
cution of ·the war, "with intent * * * to hinder * * *.the United 
States in the prosecution of the war," must not the words be taken 
in ~ir literal sense? To go back to the answer of Mr. Justice 
Holm~ in the Abrams case: 
~'They would be absurd in any other. A patriot might 
think that we-we~ wasting money on aeroplanes; or making 
more ~on of a certain kind than we needed, and ~ight 
advocate curtailment with success; yet even if it tumCd out 
•But which is nevertheless stock language among those legal 'Writers 
who are not careful of their speech. See, for example, .Hucsts, Canmr.AL 
I.Aw AND PROCEI>uu. § ~ For a good disett5sion of the ~ccurac:y o( 
the statement, see Professor Jeremiah Smith, "Surviving Fictions," 27 YAU> 
L Jou-. 141. 1s().Is8. As Judge Smith points out, if the statement is true 
that a JtlaU is really taken to intend the consequences of his acts, aery came 
.of action based on negligence is turned into one for intentional wrongdoing. 
And to such cases 
0
the doctrine of contn"butor)r negligence would not apply. 
Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442- . · 
· •McCLAIN, CRIMINAL I.Aw, § 123; BISHOP o~ CRlxINAI. LAW [;th ed.], 
§ J42i see collection of decisions in Beale's CASES ON C.tKINAL I.Aw (3rd ed.], 
beginning on p. IJ3. 
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that 'the curtailment hind~red the United States in the prose-
cution of the war, no one would hold such conduct a crime.''la 
Constructive intent". and "indirect causation" had appeared in 
lower federal court decisions under the Espibnage Act.u Does the 
Supreme Court adopt them in the Purce ca5e? Says Mr. Justice 
Pitney: 
· · '"Whether the statements contained in the pamphlets had 
a ttatural tendency to produce the forbidden conseq11ences 
* * * was a question to be dete_mined * * * by· the jury * * • 
It wa.s shown without dispute that the d~f endants distnl>uted 
the parripltlet-'The Price We Pay'-with full tmderstand-
ing of its contents; and·this of itself furnished a ground for 
attributing to thetn an intent to bring tibout * * * any ~nd all 
si_lth. co_nsequences as reasonably might be anticipated fiom 
its di.s'ln~ PH 
If the ~jorlty of our high".5.t .court are appt}ring tlie '"indi~ 
causation". and "constructive intent" tests as. a basis for. liability 
Wlder fh"e EspiOnage. Act, ·w~ have an easy· C?CI>lanation for the 
division of that body through the group of.decisions.beginning'1tiitb 
.the.Abrams case. 
This ends the diseussion of 'the constitutional right of free ·speech 
by. our litg'hest ~urt.111 We probably shall ha~ ~o more light upmr 
it from this· source in the immediate future. 
·In determiQing what is the final eff~ of tltese acJjudications ·on 
the law of free speech,. we should bear in mind:the foll«?wing: (.1) 
That the Espionage Act is a ·w.ar-time statute. an~ the court has 
emphasized a difEerence between the limits of speech. in w.ar··and · 
peace; (2) If the majon1y of the court has adopted the "indirc;cl 
causation'! and "constructive 'intent" dOctrines they have not· in so 
many. words· squarely overrultd .th~ SeR,enck ca~ with its criterion 
of "dear and prese.nt danger-" and· told the minority that 'they were 
•If' Sup •. Ct. Rep. 17, on p. 21. · 
•United States v. O'Hare, 253 Fed. 538; ·Masses. Pub. Co. v. Patten, a.w 
Fed. SJJ. See a-J\ote on "T~ Espionage Cases," 32 li.u\·.:)'... ~. 417 • 
._Italies a~ mine. The ~xcerpt.is from 40 Sup. Ct. Rep., on page :zop. 
•The last decision, O'Conn~ll v. U~ited States. 40 Sup. Ct. 444, merely 
cit4:S pr~io\i's decisions as establishing the- constitutionality of lhe EspiOnqe 
Act. . 
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doing so, and why; (3) At..-supsequent·. time the disagreements m 
the-~ may be explained :as. pertaining. to the- facts only and the 
. ~nority's expositi~n of the law may be: t4en as ·the doctrine of the 
court. 
-Finally, may. .we not ·be:..s}Ceptical ~ther.,. in. thiS present ·era of 
"social" .thought ~P Qutloak, the .right. pf fh~ minQrity .to say what 
it pleases will get the. ·.~gorous. Pr:c?tection against tlie : inajority'<S 
desire to dictate what shaU .be said that it .wowd ·have rec~ved in 
days w~ ilidiyidualistic notions 'Were .stronger? . the recatdtrant 
minority is being compelled. constantly to· subjCct: ·itself ·to many 
restrictions.upon its h~rty in doing acts hcrctof~re ci>nSide~.ptr-_ 
fectly ·liwf ul. The one time saered right .of. freedom of contract is 
fett~ed in ·evcey motion. · Laws i'Cgulatc. hours of laoo~; working 
contiitions, thc;_people one may· hirc,.the minimum wage he is allowed 
to pay, the ·damages he.-must ·give for .. indu~trial.accidents.• One 
is told° wher~ he mq bµild. an: apartrrit;nt hQiise and where ".he may 
no~ 11 His children must be vaccinated~ ins~ed,. arid. ~oiog­
ically tested" befo{e· they c:an go to· school. ·If ·he iS a veµ~eal ~us­
pect he is fUShed Willy nilly to a hospital for· inSpcctii;>n -~ treat• 
ment.11 Pure;~ of mtoxica~l~ is . prevented by a con5titutional 
am~dment; ·CYen the bu~ of· the i~ocuous ~·Camel~' or '"Fatima .. 
involves a breach of the ~aw in-~ S.tates... All of ~ in the 
name of ·protection to · society-is interpreted ··by:. the majority. . . . 
•-An i~ense amo~ ~f ·tlijs·tegislation has. come :trithin .. tbe.~·ten 
years. yet it $«IDS to be. accepted as a matter .of fact, ooCe the laws· att (Ill 
the statute boob. . 
"'That this is ·lawful under the power ~hminent do.main. is.~ holding 
'Of the Minnesota case of State ~x iet. Twin.City. etc.;-CO. T: Houghton, 176' 
· N~ W •. iS?. CoJJllllented· n~ in 4 MniN." L. Ro. So and 236, and in 18 Mlq:t. 
I.: R!v. 523-
• i ~~w, of no·~~~ law ~~u!rlng passins a pSycholOgical·test exam-
ination u a. prerequisite to ~ctmission to schools,· btit there are schools .where 
applicants ·for admission are ·testCct in this viay. Vaccination laws are of . coum C:ommon. . . 
· ··• 5ee·H 1286 et nq. of CoxP1L11J ·eo. oT low.A, 191g. See atso Ex..parte 
BroWn, 1~ .. N. \Y."·522 (~eb:). The Iowa case of· Wragg v; Grifl!n. 170·N. 
· W. 40C>, holding ~ta susPect could not be held fot the_puii)dse of making 
a ~wusemwi ·test," was deC:ided before the pre5ent Iowa statute was passtid.· 
s· low.A I.Aw BUI.UTJlf ·6j. . . . . 
. •CoMPtt.!D Cong or lowA, ~tp, §§ 88(J6 d uq. 
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Courts are upholding such "social" legislation with increasing sym-
pathy," which is what we wish them to do. The majority opinion in 
Loe/mer v. New York,u the New York bak.~rs' case, seems a long 
way off. But will not the same kind of argument and the same line 
of thought which upholds a law which restricts a man ·in the con-
tracts he may make, or limits him in the i.ise to which he may law-
fully put his real estate, uphold a law limiting the exercise of his 
tongue when the majority so wills it ?'1 
Granted the question of fre~dom of speech is one of social values, 
will not the advocates of free speech, as the champions of minimum 
wage laws, nave to convince their fellow citizens that their cause is 
righteous, that the benefits outweigh the dangers, that justice, fair 
Phy, and the common good demand that every side, no matt~ how 
unpopular, be given a hearing in the publjc's forum? Reverting to 
Mr. Justice Holmes" again,' "The best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." 
There is the. place where the battle {or restriction of freedom of 
contract has been won. If unrestricted speech cannot win in the 
same field, we shall probably have to get aJong without it. 66 
HOBERT F. GoomtcD. 
College of Law, St!lle Uni'l:e~sity·'!f Iowa. 
a 1!)8 U. S. 4S. The time measured in years is not Jong, for the cas'c was 
decided ·in 19o4. 
a See Professor Corwin's article, cited in note 8, and .a suggestion. in a 
note, "The EspiOnage. Act and the Limits of Legal Toleration," 33 Hav. J ... 
Rn-. 442. 447, for expressions of opinion somewhat along this line. 
•In his dissent in the Abrams case. 
.. Since the above discussion was written, tbe Supreme .Court has decided 
the case of Gilbert v. Minnesoti (U. S; S. Ct., Adv. Opinions, Jan. IS. I92X. 
p. 146): The defeudant was convicted for violati0n of a Minnesota statute. 
enacted during the war, making it an offense to "advoca~ • • • that the 
citizens of this state should not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting 
or carrying on war with the public enemies of the United States." Defen.d-
ant's conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the 
case came before the Fe4~r:al Supreme Cot~rt on proceedings in error. The 
judgment was 'llffirmed; opinion by Mr. Justke McKenna; Mr. Justice Hohpes 
concurred in the resulL · The Chief Justice dissented, as did Mr. Justice 
Brandeis, who wrote a dissenting opinion, 
It is to lie noted that no question of violation of the federal free speech 
clause was involved; the· statute was a creature of the state legislature, not 
congress. Nor· was the court called upon to review the correctne:;s of the 
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state court's view of its own constitution; only questions of federal righti 
were befor~ it. So denunciation of the.conduct of the accused, or diU~val 
of the sweeping prohibitions of the statute, both found in the- opinions. are 
not involved in the legal questions unless they bring in rights under law.-, 
treaties, or the Constitution of the United States. 
One ·ground of attack on the statute was that the jurisdiction .of ,Coagrea 
to legislate upon the subject was exclilsive. It. wu upon this l'l"OUild that 
the Chief Justice dissented, and Mr. Justice Brandeis •ls0. ~icd upon it u 
one reason for reversal. But the majority reject it, saying through their 
spokesman: ~'Cold and technical reasoning in- its ininute consi~tioa 1m1' 
indeed i.nsist on a separation of ·tht sovcr.cignties. •nd suistancc- in. ads to 
any cooperatiop from the other, but there is opposing demonstration ia. ~­
fact that tlUs c()Wl\ry is one composed of many,. and must on Occuicins be 
animated. as· one, an~ that the constituted and constituting ~ereisntics -~mt 
have tlie power of co0perati~ against the enemies of all. Of suds instance, 
we think. .is the statute of Minnesota; and ·it 1oes .no farther!" 
-Unless there wis some otb-er ground oo which a constitutional right 
could be invoked. then, there was nothing to de>" kt affirm the. j~ 
It was contended fot plaintiff in error that tbQ statute WU .olJnoxiom. to tlie 
"inherent right of free speech." Coric:eding there. is ·sue11 a riPt, · l&)'S die 
majority, it is subj~ to restriction and limi~ and cites the" l\spiaaqe 
Act cases. Mr. Justice Brandeis, .eontend.ing that the. sf.:atute "afft:ets riPta. 
prMleges, ~d immunities of one who is a citizen of the."Uniml Stata,• 
and tliat it to affects him as to deprive him .of liberty, is alooc on this· groi:md 
~~~~ . 
It seems to- the writer that the decision ~einfor~ the COl>ClasitJn ~ 
set out above concemfug what we ·may expect· in the way of ·c:oatt Interf• 
cnce on legislative -restrictions on speeCh. Reliance ·on ~ · ~
and immmiities oj citizens. wowd seem eYen Jes1.pi'otection. to cme 'riolaliDs 
a restriction than a free speech provi.-. · · 
